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Aristotle, the Pythagoreans, and
Structural Realism

Owen Goldin
Department of Philosophy, Marquette University
Milwaukee, WI

Abstract
[...]iron has to have the feature of rigidity for it to serve as the subject of a
saw,"" and the human tissues must have the features that they have, if they
are to be the subject of a human form. [...]the matter of a saw cannot be too
soft, but, at least for certain varieties of sawing, it cannot be too hard either.

I
Two basic questions of physics are: what is the world made of,
and why do these constituents do the things they do? These two
questions are closely related. If certain kinds of things are the ultimate
constituents of the world, it can only be because their characteristics
explain what we observe to be the case. Further, if it were possible to
grasp laws or necessary truths that explain absolutely everything,
there would be no need to appeal to any kind that underlies those
truths or laws; such a move would do no theoretical work.
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Nonetheless, in the West most scientists have offered explanations
that appeal to both what the basic things or stuff are, and the
fundamental features they possess or laws they obey.
This approach goes back to Aristotle, who insisted that
explanation in physics requires identifying both a material substrate
and a formal basis for what is to be explained. He argued that this
holds in regard to explaining both the existence of substances and the
fact that they bear certain attributes. In order to explain both why a
substance exists and why a substance does what it does, one must
appeal to its essence, as expressed in a definition that includes both
matter and form.1 An event or attribute (such as anger) is to be
accounted for both by pointing to the persisting substrate (the blood
around the heart) and the form it takes on (a kind of boiling that is the
result of perceived anger).2
Metaphysics 1 tells the story of how, in fits and starts and to
varying degrees, earlier thinkers came to realize that explanation
demands identifying all four causes, including both the material and
formal causes. Aristotle's earliest philosophical predecessors, the
Milesians, are credited with offering explanations on the basis of
matter.3 Aristotle criticizes their accounts as radically incomplete on
the grounds that matter alone cannot account for all things and their
characteristics. For example, it cannot account for goodness or
beauty.4
While the Milesians are said to have identified certain kinds of
stuff as basic, Aristotle takes other predecessors, the so-called
Pythagoreans, to have done the same for number. Aristotle associates
them with the Milesians, insofar as he understands them to give at
least some numbers the status of matter. The explanatory strategy of
explaining derivative kinds on the basis of the characteristics of the
basic kinds is the same; their dispute with the Milesians concerns what
basic characteristics are most explanatory.5 Aristotle is dismissive of
the Pythagorean notion of numbers that are not quantities of
substances: "[A] number, whatever it is, is always a number of certain
things, either of fire or earth or of units."6 Aristotle dismisses the
ontology of the Pythagoreans by indicating the confusion of positing as
basic what must inhere in a substrate. Perhaps it is a similar reaction
to the notion of a number ontology that has led some contemporary
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scholars7 to deny that Philolaus (Aristotle's likely source for
Pythagorean number ontology) could have possibly thought that all
things are made of number.
Aristotle takes the Milesian explanatory strategy to be one of
accounting for things on the basis of their being made up of certain
stuffs, which, if not identical with the perceived constituents of familiar
objects, are at least conceivable along the same lines. Today there are
few, if any, neo-Milesians. As Planck wrote: "the physical world has
become progressively more and more abstract; purely formal
mathematical operations play a growing part, while qualitative
differences tend to be explained more and more by means of
quantitative differences."8 Mathematical features are formal.
Nonetheless, Planck himself did not follow the path of Aristotle's
Pythagoreans. He felt compelled to posit a kind of substrate to physical
reality, even though he cautioned that imagining that substrate as like
the stuffs or particles familiar from sensation can be highly misleading.
In contrast, the Pythagorean strategy has new adherents, and
not only because, in this physics, "purely formal mathematical
operations play a growing part." Within recent years, a number of
philosophers and computer scientists have suggested a kind of return
to an ontology not too different from that of the Pythagoreans as
described by Aristotle. This view has been called "structural realism":
"realism" because, on this account, science describes the world as it
really is; "structural" because the realities identified are not kinds of
stuff or objects, but structures.
For this reason, it is time to again take up the Aristotelian
objection, that such an ontology is incoherent since any explanation of
physical reality must be implicitly committed to a material substrate. I
do so in the present paper, first by reconsidering the evidence, in
order to become clear on exactly what Aristotle's objection is, before
then showing how contemporary structural realists posit an ontology
much like that of Aristotle's "Pythagoreans." Both take the objects of
knowledge to be structure, not what is structured. I discuss both how
pancomputationalists such as Edward Fredkin approach the
Pythagorean account insofar as on their account all reality can in
principle be expressed as one (very big) number, made up of discrete
units, and how even more moderate varieties of structural realism, like
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that of Floridi, share with pancomputationalism the aspect of
Pythagorean ontology that Aristotle finds so objectionable: positing
structure or form with no substrate. I conclude by arguing that
Aristotle himself is drawn to something close or identical to a structural
realist ontology in book 7 of the Metaphysics. He himself comes to see
that those aspects of the world that are real, and as such intelligible,
are formal. He would agree with Saunders, who writes, "I believe that
objects are structures; I see no reason to suppose that there are
ultimate constituents of the world, which are not themselves to be
understood in structural terms. So far as I am concerned, it is turtles
all the way down."9 Such an account confirms the main lines of
Pythagorean ontology.

II
Aristotle discusses several ontologies which posit mathematical
entities as basic. Much of books 13 and 14 of the Metaphysics is
devoted to what Aristotle takes to be the incoherence of the ontology
of Plato and other members of the Academy who posited quantities as
principles separate from the things of which they are principles.10
Metaphysics 1.5 focuses on the distinctly mathematical character of
the ontology of thinkers who are referred to as "the Pythagoreans."
Aristotle writes:
[T]he so-called Pythagoreans who were the first to put their
hand to mathematics both advanced it and, having been
brought up with it, thought that its principles are the principles
of everything. Since among such principles, numbers are by
nature primary, and they thought that they saw among them
many "resemblances" (ὁμοιώματα), among beings and among
events (οὖσι καὶ γιγνομένοις), for than one does in fire and air
and water-for example, the attribute (πάθος) of number in this
thing here is justice and in that, soul and intellect, and
something else is good timing (καιρὁς) and, so to speak, this is
how things are for each of the other things-and further, since
they saw in numbers attributes and ratios of scales (τῶν
ἁρμονιῶν) — since, then, other things seemed to have their
entire nature modeled on numbers, and since, of all nature,
numbers are primary, they took the elements of numbers to be
the elements of all things, and the whole heaven to be a scale
and a number."11
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The context is a review of the views of Aristotle's predecessors
concerning the principles or sources of all things.12 Who does Aristotle
have in mind here, and does he understand them correctly? Some
earlier theorists had an intense interest in mathematical research, and
investigated correspondences between numbers and other entities, but
there is no evidence that they built on their research in order to reach
general ontological or cosmological conclusions.13 It was Philolaus who
was the first to employ mathematics to further the sorts of
investigations into the constitution of the cosmos that were first
pursued by the Milesians.14 So, Aristotle is generally thought to have
here had Philolaus in mind, and to have interpreted him as positing
number as constitutive of things. Huffman has recently argued that
this is not supported by the primary evidence, fragment 4: "And
indeed all things that are known have number. For it is not possible
that anything whatsoever be understood or known without this."
Huffman argues that this direct evidence supports attributing to
Philolaus only the more modest claim that things are known by means
of number.15 But Aristotle interprets them as presenting a
mathematical ontology,16 and then proceeds to argue against the
Metaphysicsphysical cogency of that reconstruction.
Aristotle relates that Pythagorean speculation concerning the
mathematical basis of reality has its origin in how mathematical
objects and attributes manifest themselves outside the realm of the
mathematical as such, as resemblances to mathematical entities. What
are these resemblances? Elsewhere Aristotle tells us that Eurytus
determined the number of a horse by seeing how many pebbles need
to be assembled in order to describe its shape;17 perhaps the
Pythagoreans also had in mind how the sums, differences, and the like
of numbers considered as such (that is, not as the numbers of things)
are reflected in the sums, differences, and so forth of common objects
like apples. The mathematical characteristics that are basic are seen in
the phenomenal characteristics of what they cause. However, the one
example that Aristotle here presents, how certain ratios (logoi) are
manifest in the musical scale18 does not easily conform to this model.
At Metaphysics 14.3.1090a23-25 Aristotle says that in this and similar
cases the attributes (pathē) of number are present in the derivative
things. The notes of the scale, however, or the character of harmonies
do not resemble the underlying mathematical characteristics in any
overt way; there is nothing in the phenomenological characteristics of
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hearing an octave that suggests the ratio of a double. Perhaps
Aristotle is assuming that any intelligible form of causality involves the
transmission or manifestation of the cause in the effect, even in cases
in which the nature of this connection is not immediately apparent.19
Alternatively, or in addition, Aristotle may have in mind the mode of
causal explanation employed by other Pythagoreans, that of the Table
of Opposites, according to which items in one column are thought to
carry with them other items in the same column.20 Perhaps items in
the same column are thereby thought to resemble each other. I
suspect that the term "resemblance" is not Aristotle's own, and that he
is at a loss to clearly describe the mode of causality to which the
Pythagoreans are appealing. For Aristotle speculates that the
Pythagoreans took numerical relationships and attributes to be
material causes of nonnumerical relations and attributes.21
Aristotle does not say that these Pythagoreans identified
numbers as the elements of things; rather, he says that, on this
account, it is the elements of numbers that are the elements of things,
including the totality of things, which Aristotle refers to as the whole
heaven. We may speculate that according to Aristotle's reconstruction,
these elements would serve as the ultimate material cause of all
things, and numbers would serve as a higher level of matter. The
elements of number are said to be the even and the odd, which are in
turn associated with the unlimited and the limit.22 The same passage
coordinates them with the limit and the unlimited, which are at the
very least somehow associated with the principles of limiters and
unlimiteds posited by Philolaus, but Aristotle does not spend a great
deal of time worrying about the ontological status of an independently
existing odd or even. For from an Aristotelian perspective, the notion
of something being even that is not a specific even number is no more
perplexing than the notion of a number that is not the number of a
collection of nonquantitative units.
Aristotle's fundamental objection to the Pythagorean account
concerns the order of ontological dependence, as laid out in the
Categories. Positing numbers as a substrate reverses the relation of
dependence between number and that which is numbered. Aristotle
directs his objection to attempts, like that of Plato's Timaeus, to
construct bodies out of geometrical simples. “And, in general,
conclusions contrary alike to the truth and to the usual views follow, if
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one supposes the objects of mathematics to exist thus as separate
entities. For if they exist thus they must be prior to sensible spatial
magnitudes, but in truth they must be posterior; for the incomplete
spatial magnitude is in the order of generation prior, but in the order
of substance posterior, as the lifeless is to the living.”23 Aristotle
asserts that his argument also bears on attempts, such as that
imputed to the Pythagoreans, to generate bodies out of numbers.24
But are not quantitative terms present in the definitions of substances
(as when an animal is defined as two-footed)? Aristotle would agree
with Philolaus's assertion in fragment 4, that numbers are principles of
our knowledge of things, but would insist that one need not be misled
by the presence of quantitative terms in the logos by which a
substance is defined, for priority in logos is not equivalent to
ontological priority.
“For the things that are prior in regard to substance are
those that, taken by themselves, exceed in regard to being (τῇ
μὲν γὰρ οὐσίᾳ πρότερα ὅσα χωριζόμενα τῷ εἶναι ὑπερβάλλει), but
those that are prior in regard to logos are those that are prior to
those whose logoi come from their logoi, and these are not
coextensive. For if there are not attributes, such as a "moving"
or "pale," apart from substance, then pale is prior to pale man
in respect to logos, but not in respect to substance.24
As in the Categories, the ontological primacy of substance over
nonsubstances is asserted but not argued for; an example is meant to
suffice. A quantity, such as a number, is an attribute and as such can
be independent of the numbered no more than a quality, like pale, can
be independent of that which is qualified. What is not a substance
requires a substance in which to inhere, while a substance does not
require that which is not substantial.25 Aristotle's account is
problematic: though one might grant that there cannot be a "red"
which is not the red of an object, one can similarly say of many
substances that they cannot exist without being of some color or
another (red, blue, or another).26 The fundamental difference between
substances and nonsubstances lies in what Aristotle in the CategoHes
identifies as a unique feature of a primary substance: as a substrate, it
remains the same as it undergoes change.27 The same apple can turn
from green to red, but the same red cannot turn from an apple to a
pear. In regard to quantitative features, among which numbers are
found, the same substance can change in respect to quantity, but the
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same quantity cannot change in respect to the substrate of which it is
a quantity. This is what it means to "exceed in being."28
The Pythagoreans are positing numbers, or the elements of
numbers, as the fundamental beings or elements out of which all
things are constituted. Numbers, or their elements, play the role in
Pythagorean Metaphysics that substances play in Aristotelian
Metaphysics: they are the ultimate substrate of things. The Aristotelian
response here is a bald assertion that this cannot be so. The
Pythagoreans need not be without rejoinder. Aristotle himself grants
that there can be substantial change while a nonsubstantial feature
remains the same. One stuff can become another (as wine becomes
vinegar) while the place (the inside of a bottle) remains constant."29
Aristotle has the theoretical resources for dealing with this, insofar as
he posits a material substrate that underlies both wine and vinegar.30
But, as he is well aware from his study of the Timaeus, one could also
posit space or place as that which stays the same while the
characteristics that occupy place change, and that place might well be
understood quantitatively. Positing a quantity as that which remains
the same through a process of change is not nonsense on the face of
it.
Elsewhere Aristotle presents a more fundamental objection
against a Pythagorean mathematical-physical ontology. Physical
objects are those with a nature (phusis) which is a kind of principle of
motion and change.31 The principles posited by the Pythagoreans in
question apply to all beings, both those that are capable of motion and
those that are not. For this reason, the principles that the
Pythagoreans posit as responsible for physical reality are more
appropriate (ἁρμοττούσας) for accounts that are “higher” (that is,
more general) than those concerning nature.32 Motion in general can
be neither derived from nor explained by the principles they posit,
namely, limit and unlimited, even and odd, and number.33 A fortiori
such accounts say nothing about the most basic natural motions
(upward and downward) proper to light and heavy bodies.34 "Insofar
as they make natural bodies, which have lightness and weight, out of
numbers, which are without lightness and weight, they seem to speak
of another heaven and other bodies, not of those that are sensible."35
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Aristotle is here asking about the source of the nonmathematical
characteristics of bodies.36 His example is weight (and its counterpart,
lightness). Weight is for us a quantity, identified with a measurement
read off of a scale, whether real or hypothetical. But for Aristotle,
weight is a potentiality to move downward;37 although the motion can
be described quantitatively, the motion is not itself a quantity. How is
it, Aristotle wonders, that quantities alone can generate regular natural
motions?38 In an implicit appeal to the Parmenidean principle that
nothing comes from nothing,39 Aristotle argues that weight can only
come from what has weight, and numbers are not the sort of thing
that has weight. On the face of it, this is an odd argument for Aristotle
to make. For why is it any less conceivable for quantities to have
weight than it is for a substance, like a living thing, to have a color?
On Aristotle's account, living things are essentially bodies, bodies by
their essence have surfaces, and surfaces are (usually) colored.
Likewise, the Pythagoreans can be understood as saying that numbers
are simply the sorts of things as to have weight (sometimes?).
Aristotle would likely respond to this objection by appealing to his
distinction between potentiality and actuality. Even though color may
well not be part of their essence, living things have this color or that
because their essence entails the possession of certain potentialities,
which either include or entail the potentiality to have a color. In
contrast, the essences of numbers are wholly mathematical. They have
no potentialities, outside of the "powers" by which they stand in
certain properly arithmetical relations to other numbers. This is why
nonmathematical features cannot be inferred from mathematical
definitions.40 Considered in themselves, they neither include nor entail
the potentiality to have nonnumerical features. To meet Aristotle's
objection, the Pythagoreans would have to show how numbers include
more than the mathematical features that are posited by the
arithmeticians who study them; they also include certain
nonmathematical potentialities. Such numbers would not be numbers
as studied by mathematics. So on Aristotle's account, quantities
require a nonquantitative substrate, and if one truly grasps the
essence of the substrate, one would understand why it has the
essential quantitative features that it has (for example, by grasping
the essence of a horse, one would understand why it has the shape
that it has, and why its size lies within a certain range). But note that
the two accounts are structurally parallel.
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On the Pythagorean account, nonquantities require a
quantitative substrate, and if one truly grasps the essence of the
substrate, one would understand why the substrate has the
nonquantitative features that it has. For example, a study of the ratios
holding among numbers would explain why musical concords sound as
they do.
We have seen that Aristotle faults the Pythagoreans on the
grounds that they try to explain all things on the basis of mathematical
objects. Not all facts of the world can be made intelligible on the basis
of mathematical principles; only mathematical truths can.
Nonmathematical truths can be explained only on the basis of
nonmathematical principles. In nearly all cases, these principles will be
the essences of the substances in which mathematical entities inhere.
It turns out that in some cases (especially in biology), explanation will
be grounded not in the essence of the substance, but in the essence of
the material kind in which the substance inheres. In either such case,
the Pythagoreans are to be faulted with grounding explanations in
formal characteristics (such as mathematical features) alone, to the
exclusion of the kinds that are their subjects. Both must be known.
Both exist, and certain formal characteristics, such as the
mathematical ones, must be recognized as inherent in more basic
principles.

III
Some of Aristotle's criticisms of the Pythagoreans are less
persuasive to us now than they would have been to his
contemporaries. Aristotle presumes that there is no way to derive
most of the natural characteristics of things (qualities such as color
and temperature, as well as the natural motions proper to certain
kinds) from mathematical characteristics alone. Modem science casts
doubt on this. That is not to say that there are not still major
difficulties in accounting for the phenomenological aspects of color,
sound, and the like. This remains a major mystery to which those who
adopt computational models of cognition (which includes most
structural realists) have little to say. But today's Aristotelians would
echo Aristotle's main criticism of Pythagorean number ontology: formal
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structures and quantities inhere in more basic subjects.41 In order to
know things, one must know both the structures and the subjects.
Both of these points are denied by “ontic” structural realism,
which has been defined as "a realism towards physical structures in
the sense of networks of concrete physical relations, without these
relations being dependent on fundamental physical objects that
possess an intrinsic identity as their relata."42 This view has a number
of philosophical motivations, of which the main one is epistemological.
Structural realism is seen as a way of bypassing the traditional debate
in the philosophy of science between realism and antirealism. Realists
have insisted that scientific theories are offered as describing the world
as it really is. The realist account of the semantics of scientific
propositions is supported by the answer one usually receives when one
asks scientists themselves what they are saying: that their accounts
are in fact offering at least a provisional account of how things are in
the world. To this antirealists point out that scientific theories are in a
constant state of revision, and that there is no way to be sure that
some future theory might come to supplant a current one. So, the
argument goes, even the best of our scientific theories are likely
someday to be condemned as false. It would follow that scientific
theories, on the realist understanding, are attempts to do what might
well be undoable. But any philosophy of science that would cast
scientific theories to the flames has something amiss. So antirealists
deny that successful scientific theories are to be understood as
explaining the real constitution of things. Their success lies elsewhere.
Different kinds of antirealists have different views as to what this
something else is. For example, instrumentalists take scientific
propositions to be parts of theories, which themselves are to be
regarded as instruments enabling one to make predictions concerning
what will be observed under certain situations, an ability of vital
importance for technology.
Structural realism is presented as a way to solve the problem.
On that account, a scientific theory is not telling us about things, that
is, the subjects of certain formal characteristics. Rather, it is telling us
about formal characteristics alone: “What differentiates the resulting
form of structural realism from standard scientific realism is that the
latter regards the mind-independent modal relations between
phenomena as supervenient on the properties of unobservable objects
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and the external relations between them, rather than this structure
being ontologically basic.”43 The structural characteristics of formerly
accepted theories are isomorphic to, or mappable onto, the structure
of the theories that have superseded them. The new theories are
better not because they indicate what is real whereas the old theories
did not, but because have the advantage of saying more about the
very structure that was recognized all along.44 Structural realists say
that in identifying basic structures science does describe the world as
it is, but makes no claims about the nature of anything that underlies
those structures.45
Structural realism has some support in innovations in computer
science. Understanding the human mind as arising from computations
grounded in the brain allows for an answer to a major problem with
realism: how exactly is it that the mind is thought to be able to
apprehend an extramental reality? The classic Aristotelian answer is
that the human being is so constituted as to enable the knowable
aspect of a thing to be present in the knowing subject. Thus, the
sensible form red, by virtue of which I know that an object (such as an
apple) is red, becomes somehow present in the sense organ, which is
part of the whole ensouled perceptive animal.46 When one knows the
essence of a substance such as an apple tree, one in a sense becomes
identical with the form of the apple tree, a process that, according to
Aristotle, requires an immaterial soul.47 The structural realist can make
a similar move without compromising the materialist presuppositions
of much of cognitive science. The structures in the world are
information; a computational system, such as the human mind, can
access that very information at various "levels of abstraction" and
internally represent and manipulate it in certain ways that allow for
various interactions with the world.48
A third advantage of structural realism is the virtue of economy.
Structural realism allows for a minimum of ontological commitments.
We recall that the Milesians, as Aristotle interpreted them, took there
to be at bottom one kind of thing, the nature of which would explain
the multiplicity of phenomena. Aristotle argues that this scheme is
unworkable, for adequate explanations require a multiplicity of formal
elements, which in turn requires various kinds of matter in which to be
instantiated. So, on the Aristotelian scheme, any adequate ontology
requires two kinds of beings. There are formal elements, and there are
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the subjects in which those elements inhere. In a contemporary
context, these two can be understood as the natural laws that govern
basic things or particles, on the one hand, and those basic things or
particles themselves, on the other. Traditional scientific realism is
committed to both of these, even though the content of its theories
concern only the former — as theories say nothing about strings or
quarks beyond the mathematical accounts of their features and
behavior. Traditional realism, then, is committed to positing the
existence of that which is knowable only as placeholder for its formal
characteristics. But what if all of these formal elements are united as
being "information"?49 What if all there is is information, and physical
reality does not require a physical substrate for that information?
Structural realism avoids commitment to an unknowable principle. Like
the Milesians on Aristotle's understanding, structural realists posit only
one kind of thing in principle able to ground explanations of
everything.
There is a possible fourth advantage to structural realism. If
taken in a certain direction, it has potential to answer some very big
questions concerning the nature of causality and of time and space. In
the guise of pancomputationalism, structural realism goes beyond the
thesis that physical processes, as governed by scientific laws, are a
matter of regularities in how certain arrays of information determine
others, to a view concerning how exactly this occurs: the cosmos is a
vast computer.50 Physical reality is constituted by information of
multidimensional space and time, laid out, somehow, in some sort of a
grid (which can have as few as one dimension).51 Physical laws are the
software, according to which information at one point in space/time is
determined as information at another point. Such a thesis not only
gives us a unified account of what the world is made of, but also
allows the processes that govern the world to have some element of
intelligibility. We might not be able make sense of light being both a
wave and a particle, or of causal action at a distance, but the notion of
a universal Turing machine is one that is familiar and intelligible. It
provides a model by which we can make sense of the workings of all
physical reality.52 But the thesis that the cosmos is a computer has
been widely rejected among structural realists.53 This is not only
because it seems fanciful and too open to quasi-theological
speculations concerning the origins and the purpose of the system. It
is also because it rests on two assumptions not shared by most
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physicists. First, this thesis requires that reality be understood as
discrete, not continuous (for computers work through manipulation of
determinate symbols, all of which can in principle be encoded in a
binary way, as a sequence of 0s and 1s). There is no evidence for this,
except extrapolation from the historical record of the history of
science.54 Second, the thesis is deterministic. Leaving aside familiar
philosophical objections to determinism, the thesis counters the
standard (Copenhagen) view of the interdeterminacy of events at the
quantum level.55 In both cases, Fredkin is confident that future
developments in physics will confirm his hunches.
In both varieties of structural realism there are deep parallels to
the thought of the Pythagoreans as Aristotle describes them. Yes, the
Pythagoreans restrict their ontology to numbers, while contemporary
structural realists are open to structures of all kinds. But numbers,
taken either individually or in relation to one another, are examples of
structure. Not all structures can be expressed numerically, and for the
Pythagoreans as for all ancient Greeks, numbers would be integers, for
which reason continuous structures would not be accepted in
Pythagorean ontology. But if one accepts the thesis of
pancomputationalism, the correspondence would be more exact, as all
Turing machines manipulate discrete data, and all discrete data can be
encoded as a series of binary elements, 0s and 1s, which together can
be understood as constituting numbers (in base 2).
According to structural realism of whatever variety, things are
known by virtue of knowing structures. In ontic structural realism,
these structures are the objects in question-there is no substrate of
the numbers or structures posited as an unknowable surd. (This is not
strictly speaking the case for pancomputationalism. For on this view
the universe is the result of a cosmic computer. Both software and
data are informational. But what of the hardware? This is unknown and
unknowable. Fredkin calls it "the Other." He treats it as noumenal and
waxes theological concerning its source.56 Perhaps this hardware can
be considered the substrate for the structures involved — but only in
an extended sense, as the structures have their status as information
only in the context of a whole system of other structures. Suppose
that we have a series of 0s and 1s as instantiated in a series of
physical switches. The switches themselves are the proper subject not
for the information, but only for the attributes being open or closed, all
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of which is irrelevant to the computational system considered as such.
For Fredkin, the information that is constitutive of physical reality is
encoded in something, but that something is not itself part of or an
aspect of the physical reality that is known. So although there is some
sort of unknowable substrate, it would not be a substrate in the
Aristotelian sense. It is not the case that the substrate has special
potentialities for the kind of information instantiated in it — rather, like
Aristotle's passive intellect, it can serve as a substrate for any
information whatsoever. As such it is of a different ontological order
than the information within it. The reality that the hypothesis is meant
to account for is the reality of the structural information that is
computed, not the system that is itself responsible for the
computations.)
We see that structural realism, like Aristotelian realism,
recognizes the need to posit an ontological grounding for the adequacy
of scientific theories. But it does so without assuming that there is a
certain ontological substrate for the formal structures by which we
know things. Here it is in agreement with Pythagorean ontology and
epistemology as described by Aristotle. Aristotle rejects such a scheme
as unintelligible. He asserts without argument that numbers and other
quantities must be quantities of some more basic thing. In the final
part of this paper I suggest that, in his most probing speculations
concerning substance, he himself resorts to Pythagorean ways of
understanding the ontology of form.

IV
In Metaphysics 7.3 Aristotle pursues the ultimate implications of
his view that the foundational realities or elements of things, which he
calls ousiai (substances), are the ultimate subjects. What can we say
about such substrates, considered in themselves? Aristotle conducts a
mental experiment by which he examines such a substrate, from
which we have mentally subtracted all actual features as well as the
potentialities for them. He is left with a something that is nothing, a
substrate that has no characteristics at all,57 an Aristotelian analogue
to the "bare particular" of the early analytic tradition.58 Such a thing is
inconceivable, hence impossible. Exactly what conclusion Aristotle
draws from this is unclear. To a large extent this issue determines the
The Review of Metaphysics, Vol 69, No. 4 (June 2016): pg. 687-707. DOI. This article is © Philosophy Documentation
Center and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Philosophy
Documentation Center does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere
without the express permission from Philosophy Documentation Center.

15

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

path one will take in interpreting Aristotle's larger account of
substance in the central books of the Metaphysics. Perhaps Aristotle
drops ultimate subjecthood as a criterion for substantiality. Perhaps
Aristotle maintains that criterion, and comes to affirm that it is not
indeterminate matter but form or the form/matter composite that
serves as ultimate subject, and hence substance.
One moral of the mental experiment is clear: one ought not to
follow the Milesians in trying to explain by identifying basic substrates,
without an account of the formal characteristics of those substrates
that make them what they are. It is on Aristotle's own account
inconceivable, and hence impossible, for there to be a featureless
substrate, and features are formal characteristics distinct, at least in
logos, from the subjects in which they inhere.
The subjects Aristotle posits are not featureless. They have
essences. Substances are subjects with essences that make them the
kind of substance they are. Substances come to be insofar as their
form (or essence) is actualized in a more basic subject, which is
matter. This matter itself has certain features, which are responsible
for the potentialities to take on certain substantial forms. Thus iron
has to have the feature of rigidity for it to serve as the subject of a
saw,"" and the human tissues must have the features that they have,
if they are to be the subject of a human form. These features are
themselves formal; they are determinations of an indeterminate
qualitative expanse. Thus the matter of a saw cannot be too soft, but,
at least for certain varieties of sawing, it cannot be too hard either.
Flesh cannot be too hard or too soft. For Aristotle, these determinate
states of rigidity or heat are not quantitative. But they are not
substantial either.
We recall that Aristotle's core criticism against the Pythagoreans
was that they were positing a nonsubstance as a subject. Aristotle
does the same in regard to matter. Matter, considered simply as a
substrate, is unintelligible. The formal features of the kind of matter
are what give it ontological standing and some degree of intelligibility.
Likewise, substances serve as ontological subjects, and are basic in
scientific explanation of other aspects of reality, only insofar as they
have certain definitional features, which are also formal.
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We have seen that structural realists are compelled to accept
one of two options. Either a subject of information is posited (as a kind
of hardware and basis for digital memory) — about which nothing can
be known and which stands outside of the reality in which one lives —
or one dispenses altogether with an ontological subject for
information. These positions are similar to those between which
Aristotle must choose: positing as ultimate subject an indeterminate
unknowable subject, and positing as ultimate subject what is
constituted by one or more formal characteristics. While certain
structural realists entertain the possibility that it is structure "all the
way down," Aristotle, like the Pythagoreans he so readily dismisses,
and like paneomputationalists, would insist on a bottom level of form,
structure, or information in which all else inheres.60
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